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Some Personal Recollections
of Army Operational Research
on Radar in World War II
George Lindsey

perational Research had its origin at the
beginning of the Second World War, and made
important early contributions to many aspects of the
Air Defence of Great Britain, an activity of
monumental significance in the war. Air defence
depended for its success on the development of a
command, control, communication and information
system on a scale that had never been approached
before. It also depended on other types of technology,
such as high performance aircraft, air-to-airweapons
and anti-aircraft artillery, and, most critically, on the
new science of radar. All of these offered
opportunities for applications ofoperational research,
as did the study of tactics for individual engagements
and of strategy for the optimum allocation of
dangerously scarce resources.

O

Of the many technological developments that
made advances throughout the course ofWorld War
II, radar was the one which saw the greatest
improvement in capabilities and had the most
significant influence on operations. The contributions
of radar to fire control of weapons, and the direction
and navigation of aircraft and ships, called for
systematic studies of the technical design and
performance of the radar, of the weapons depending
on its information, of the capabilities of the human
operators, and of the design and effectiveness of the
entire system of which the radar was one vital part.
This provided a glorious opportunity for
operational research. There was an atmosphere of
extreme urgency. There were no worries about
budgets. There was no time for extensive
instrumented field trials or operational
evaluation-new equipment was rushed into

service. The data on effectiveness under field
conditions was obtained from real operations.
In earlier years it was possible to find people
who held senior positions in organizations
conducting important military operations, and
could therefore give a first hand account of the
critical decisions and results as seen "top down"
from the highest level. But if one wants to go back
as far as World War II, where operational research
was born, it is getting increasingly difficult to find
survivors who held senior appointments in the
early 1940s. I am not one of these. However, I
was fortunate enough to have been able to
participate in operational research during World
War II at a junior level, and to have spent most of
the half century since then in the study and
practice of military OR.
I am going to describe a few incidents which
occurred in the life of a junior army officer engaged
in military operational research on the applications
of radar to air defence, during an extremely active
period. So what you are going to receive is a bottomup worm's eye view of operational research during
its interesting pioneer period fifty years ago.

*****

1\ s Britain mobilized for war, both the Royal
r-\Navy and the Royal Air Force foresaw the corning
importance of radar and the need for personnel with
the technical background that would be necessary
to operate and maintain the succession of new types
of equipment that would follow one another as the
radically new technology progressed. Britain's
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scientists were quickly directed into a variety of
wartime activities, with the RAF getting most of
those whose backgrounds were related to radar.
A request was made to Canada to provide suitable
people. Several Canadian universities identified
students nearing graduation in physics,
engineering, and mathematics, and organized a
series of courses. The Navy recruited the first
batch, and at one time every capital ship in the
RN had a Canadian radar officer. Later the air
force and the army had their turn.
Nobody really knew who would be in charge
of radar in the Canadian army. The Royal
Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps
(REME) had not been invented. Signallers were
believed to know something about electricity and
wireless, but the army wanted to use their radars
to direct gunfire. My badges were changed from
University of Toronto Canadian Officers' Training
Corps to Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, and
then to Royal Canadian Artillery.

Mter I graduated from basic courses for coast
defence and anti-aircraft artillery, and a very good
course on army radar, I was listed as a Lieutenant
(EMFC). The term stood for "Electrical Methods of
Fire Control," a term that was intended to fool
the enemy, but sometimes resulted in expectations
that my job was to put out fires in the barracks.
The word "radar" was secret, although we could
talk about "radio location."
The magnetron was so secret that one of my
early duties was to guard a magnetron with a pistol
for every minute of its journey from Ottawa to a
coastal defence battery in Halifax, where an
experimental fire control radar, based on a new
centimetric set designed for anti-aircraft use, was
to be tested. The regular battery officers were
absolutely confident of the infallible accuracy of
their optical fire control, which was based on
combining the bearings observed from two
telescopes sited at the mouth of the harbour. They
resented the intrusion of this crazy newfangled
invention. The fmal test came when the guns frred
9.2-inch shells at a small towed target, using radar
information. In the test, the fall of shot (easily
visible both optically and by radar), straddled the
target, but the battery declared the radar to be a
failure since the target had not received a direct
hit. We asked Halifax Fortress to show us their
optical plot, so we could compare it with our radar
plot. This was refused. Later a friendly spy

revealed that one of their telescopes was reporting
true bearings and the other magnetic bearings,
with the resultant plot making its way over dry
land. Fortunately no German battleship came to
provide another test of the coastal defences of
Canada.
In 1943 I was posted to the British Army
Operational Research Group, to work in the section
responsible for air defence and radar. The activities
included the operation of recording vans on Heavy
Anti-Aircraft (HAA) gunsites deployed all over Britain.
These vans made photographic records of data from
the radar, predictor, and guns, taken during an
engagement. The analysts then reconstructed the
behaviour of these devices, and estimated where the
target had been and where the shells had burst.
Errors made during each engagement could be
assessed. Data pooled from many engagements was
analyzed to detect trends, including changes in
enemy tactics.
The complicated process of the radar fire control
ofHAA contained errors in many steps. Electrical
and mechanical calibrations were not perfect. Human
operators, of whom there were many in the systems
of those days, could not track the fluctuating radar
echoes from moving targets or match the moving
pointers on dials perfectly. The fuse setter added
delays and made small errors. The predictor's output
depended on an assumption regarding the motion
of the target while the shell was in flight.
Many of the errors introduced by humans were
reduced by increasing the degree of automation.
Radar data could be fed directly into the predictor,
and the motion of the guns and the setting of the
fuse could be made automatic and slaved to the
predictor commands.
A memorable incident occurred during the
program to make the guns follow automatically. A
demonstration was organized to display this wonder
to a high-ranking group of visitors. On a clear day
they gathered around the guns, observed the radar
acquire a track, saw the target tow cross well
within range and watched the guns move steadily
and remorselessly in response to their automatic
instructions. They continued to watch in surprise
as all of the guns suddenly elevated to 90° and
fired a vertical salvo. When the visitor's ears had
stopped ringing they discussed this unexpected
event for a few seconds, until one of them
remembered that what goes up must come do~.
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whereupon they abandoned their dignified
demeanour and demonstrated remarkable
abilities to sprint in all directions.
Automation introduced its own problems in
many ways. For example, radar signals tend to
fluctuate, so that their indications jitter about the
correct values, while the predictor needs steady input
or it will produce wildly changing estimates of future
position. The input data can be smoothed by ahtunan
operator, which requires judgement, or it can be fed
through an electrical filter, set to smooth over a
selected time period. But what is the best time
constant? Too short and there is the unwanted jitter.
Too long and there will be a sluggish response to a
real change in the course, height, or speed of the
target. A compromise was attempted with "rate-aided
laying," which caused the reading to change at a
constant rate until the operator moved his control,
at which time an immediate shift in position was

combined with a small change in the rate. But
what should be the proportion between Delta x
and Delta x dot? A major step was to make the
radar follow automatically, but this made it
vulnerable to ejection of what is now called chaff
from the target, which could seduce the radar to
follow the strongest echo in the vicinity, quite likely
to be a bundle of chaff.
I vividly remember one visit to a four-gun 3. 7inch HAA gunsite near London soon after the
Luftwaffe had started to use chaff. We picked up an
approaching bomber and followed it smoothly. I was
watching the A-scope tracking the range. All of a
sudden the radar blip started to multiply and leave
replicas of itself behind. The operator continued to
track the leading blip, which was reflected from the
aircraft, whose bundles of chaff were soon left behind
in the slipstream. Then the guns opened up, with
a most peculiar tune in four-four time; three great

2nd Lieutenant George Lindsey,
Royal Canadian Artillery, 1942
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booms followed by a hollow bonk as if someone
had struck a hollow drainpipe. This got my close
attention, since I had just been reading a report
about dangerous wear in barrel liners, causing
premature explosions at the gunsite. New liners
were in short supply, so that changes were made
one gun at a time. Obviously, the number four
gun in our battery was overdue for a liner change.
The Vickers and Sperry AA predictors were
marvels of mechanical ingenuity. They were special
purpose real-time analogue computers, long before
digital technology or semiconductor chips had been
invented. Their variables were processed in the form
of shaft rotations, their memories were stored on
three-dimensional cams whose shapes represented
ballistic data and trigonometric functions, and
their programs were embedded in the mechanical
linkages. They were advertised as soldier-proof, a
foolish boast which proved to be untrue. Their
successors, the Bedford-Cossor and the Bell
Telephone Labs BTL, were electrical analogue
computers, whose data were recorded as voltages,
memories were in potentiometers, and programs in
hard-wired circuitry.

All predictors had to be provided with an
assumption (which would now be called an algorithm)
regarding the future motion of the moving target. The
simplest hypothesis was that the target would
maintain the same course, speed, and height that it
had at the moment that the fuse was set. But the
pilot could falsify that assumption by taking evasive
action, although this might spoil an accurate bomb
run. Prediction along the tangent to the track would
cope with a steady descent on a constant beartng,
but would produce a future position that would
oscillate wildly ahead of a snaked track, and would
never be correct against a helical track. It could
predict along a chord, but what chord? Today such
problems would be classified as artificial intelligence.
A solution to this problem of evasive action
was offered by the Crabtree predictor, which
allowed a human operator to place his personal
estimate of the future position on a plot, and then
direct the guns to hit that spot. An experimental
mockup was built, and an RAF pilot, who it was
hoped might have psychic powers regarding the
habits of his Luftwaffe counterparts, practised his
skills against British bomber pilots, and predicted
their manoeuvres with remarkable success. The
equipment was installed on a gunsight in London,
with the latest twin 5.25-inch navalAAguns, and

the next real air raid eagerly awaited. Alas, the
Luftwaffe did not oblige for a long time. Finally
the sirens went, a detection was made on the
radar, and a hostile target approached the gunsite.
The psychic pilot commenced his duties,
concentrating with extraordinary skill, oblivious
to the excitement of the rest of the team, and
successfully forecast every manoeuvre of the
German bomber. Finally the bomber disappeared
from the display, the pilot looked up, exhausted
but elated and inquired "How did I do?" The
answer was "You never gave us the order to fire!"
The cumulative results of experience, and
technical improvements, aided by operational
research, increased the effectiveness of AA
Command against German bomber aircraft between
1941 and 1944 by a factor estimated to be between
four and five.
The Air Defence of Great Britain encountered a
new challenge in 1944, just after the launching of
the D-Day cross-channel invasion of France. The V1
unmanned pulse-jet flying bomb, in today's
terminology a Ground-Launched Cruise Missile,
provided a target for air defence that was easier in
one respect, in that it took no evasive action, but more
difficult in several others, in that it was smaller
and faster than the bombers of the day, flew at an
altitude that was too low for easy engagement by
HAA but too high for Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA),
and was likely to inflict serious damage even if
brought down by AA fire unless its warhead was
detonated in the air.
The new threat caused AA Command to make
major redeployments of the forces which had been
stationed in static sites for the defence of British cities.
Only cities in the south of England were within range
of the V1launch sites in France, and of these by far
the most important target was London. Once a V1
reached London it was not useful to shoot it down
and have its bomb detonate in the city; it was better
to leave it alone in the hope that it would keep on
going and land in the open country to the north of the
city.
The first strategy was to move the guns from
all over Britain to the North Downs, between
London and the Channel, with fighter aircraft
operating to the south and barrage balloons to
the north of the gun belt. An immediate difficulty
arose due to the rolling hills in the area and the
low altitude of the approaching V1s, which did
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not enter the lowest radar beams and clear the
ground clutter until they had penetrated to very
close range. An improvement was obtained by
installing a large horizontal wire screen around
the radar site, a practice that had been adopted
earlier for fixed sites around cities, and adding a
low vertical wire fence at the perimeter of the
screen. The resulting diffraction pattern of the
radar energy allowed a concentrated lower beam
to escape the ground clutter but achieve early
detection of the small approaching target.
Nevertheless, the results were disappointing, and
other difficulties of an operational nature were
encountered in demarcation of the boundaries of
operating zones for guns and for fighters. Overall,
the fighters obtained better results than the guns.
I remember receiving a decidedly chilly
welcome in a town in Sussex, whose inhabitants
disapproved of the attempts of the gunners to
bring the V1s down into their town, instead of
letting them proceed on to London. I also
remember watching a V1 land in London about a
mile away from where I was standing, saw a dark
spherical shock wave expanding into the sky from
the point of impact, then felt the shock wave
coming through the ground, with my feet, and
later heard and felt the blast propagated through
the air.
As well as attempting to make HAA operate
at altitudes below those for which it was most
effective, efforts were made to improve the
capabilities ofLAA at altitudes higher than those
for which it had been designed. The 40 mm shells
for the Bofors guns were contact-fused, so that
there was no time fuse to set, but to damage the
target a direct hit was necessary. Ranges and times
of flight were short, and optical tracking in bearing
and angle of sight was quite accurate. The
Kerrison LAA predictor would work reasonably
well if fed with accurate range data, but the
various optical methods of estimating range were
crude and notoriously inaccurate. As a solution
it was suggested that a simple radar range-only
set designed for the tail gun turret of Lancaster
bombers, whose gunners could also track
direction optically but required accurate range
data, should be mounted on the Kerrison
predictor. I participated in the work at
Telecommunications Research Establishment
(TRE), which had designed the aircraft radar, and
were preparing to modify the equipment for the
AA predictors in their own model shop. I then

went to LAA sites to observe their operations. I
remember one night watching a V1 make a low
approach directly over our gunsite, and being
engaged with very visible tracer-equipped shells.
I also remember eagerly anticipating a hit, and
then suddenly wondering what would happen
after we hit the target. I never found out.
The unsatisfactory deployment of the AA gun
zone south of London was radically corrected, by
moving all calibers down to a narrow belt right at the
channel coast, from where they could have an
unobstructed line of sight over the water with no
obstacles, and on a clear night even see the V1s
almost as soon as they were launched from France.
V1s damaged by AA fire usually fell into the sea.
Two other factors were also changed for the better.
American SCR-584 radars with fully automatic
tracking and data transmission were deployed in large
numbers, and the guns were armed with the new
and very secret proximity fuses. It was an AA
gunners' paradise. (Lesser branches of the army, and
all branches of the air force, maintain that anti-aircraft:
gunners never go to Paradise, but I now know that
this is not true.) I remember looking along the
channel coast on a clear night and seeing seven
V1s in flight at the same time, greeted by a
spectacular display offrreworks, including 20 mm
shells landing in the water at about 1 I 3 of the
range to their target, 40 mm tracer passing very
close to their targets, 90 mm and 3. 7-inch
proximity-fused shells detonating about 50 feet
above the water well beyond their targets, other
HAA shells bursting very close to the targets, and
occasionally a wonderful giant explosion when a
V1 warhead was detonated. Mter that Guy Fawkes
and the 24th of May have never seemed very
impressive.
In addition to its investigations of air defence,
Army Operational Research Section 1 (AORS 1)
made some studies of the use of radar in support of
field artillery. It was suggested that mortar bombs,
which were causing severe casualties to infantry in
the Far East, might be tracked in their slow high
parabolic trajectories, and the launcher located for
counter frre. But the mortar bombs were very small
and the polar diagram of the radar reflections
would depend on the precise shape and angle of
observation. We needed to measure the reflections
from a real Japanese mortar bomb. One which
had been captured in Burma was available in an
ordnance establishment near London, and I was
provided with a jeep and told to go and get it. It
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had a rather sinister appearance, with Japanese
stencils on it, and the explosives expert who was
about to give it to me seemed to treat it with
considerable caution. I explained that we were
only interested in its outer casing, nose, and fms,
and had no interest in its interior. He asked me if
I planned to remove the fuse, detonator, and high
explosive. This was not the way I had planned
my day, and I explained that our laboratory was
lacking some of the necessary equipment and
asked him if he could possibly save us some time
and do this for me. This he did, with me as a very
attentive and alert bystander. I noticed that he
held the fuse between his thumb and little finger,
which seemed an odd grip for something not to
be dropped. He explained that if it went off he
might save one or two fingers that way. I was
content to bring the bomb back to Ibstock Place
without its innards.
When the Canadian Anny decided to establish
its own Army Operational Research Group and
prepare to move its operations to the Pacific Theatre,
I was posted back to Canada.
This account has focused on the type of
operational research that is closely associated with
the technical performance of equipment forming
an element of a complicated system. At the time,
many functions which had been performed by
humans, with inevitable inaccuracy, were being
converted to automatic operation, which removed
errors, but sometimes introduced new problems
involving the need for human judgment.
The type of problems with command, control,
communication, and information systems being

discussed fifty years later have some of the same
elements. Operational Research will be needed, and
the practitioners may have to become very
knowledgeable regarding the technical performance
of the various types of equipment involved in the
systems. Exercises must approximate the
operational situation as closely as is possible in
peacetime. But the studies may not be as exciting
as they were in AORG in 1944.

This paper was first presented at the Eleventh
International Symposium on Military Operational
Research, Royal Military College of Science,
Shrivenham, England in September 1994.
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